Tsunami and seiche hazards in site evaluation for nuclear installations
No abstract available.
Safety Reports Series↗
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Selected U.S. Bureau of Mines reports on Alaska indexed by quadrangle
Most U.S. Bureau of Mines reports on the geology and mineral resources of Alaska that were published or placed in open files through April 30, 1974, are listed by the quadrangles (scale 1:250,000) into which Alaska has been divided for topographic mapping (p. 2). References to reports that deal with Alaska as a whole and cannot be readily assigned to individual quadrangles or deal with many scattered parts of the state are listed under ALASKA - GENERAL, which appears before the alphabetically arranged quadrangle listings. References to the Minerals Yearbook, published annually, are not included as this periodical contains mainly statistical data. Also omitted are reports on mining, milling, and metallurgical practices; compilations of coal, oil, and gas analyses unless data on geological occurrences are also given; and reports on permissible explosives, health, and safety. This index is the second in a planned series of specialized lists, arranged by quadrangle, that will facilitate library research on the geology and mineral resources of Alaska. The first in the series is "Geological Survey open-file reports on Alaska indexed by quadrangle," by Edward H. Cobb, which was released as open-file report 74-7 on May 16, 1974.
Alaska↗
Large scale Wyoming transportation data: a resource planning tool
The U.S. Geological Survey Fort Collins Science Center created statewide roads data for the Bureau of Land Management Wyoming State Office using 2009 aerial photography from the National Agriculture Imagery Program. The updated roads data resolves known concerns of omission, commission, and inconsistent representation of map scale, attribution, and ground reference dates which were present in the original source data. To ensure a systematic and repeatable approach of capturing roads on the landscape using on-screen digitizing from true color National Agriculture Imagery Program imagery, we developed a photogrammetry key and quality assurance/quality control protocols. Therefore, the updated statewide roads data will support the Bureau of Land Management’s resource management requirements with a standardized map product representing 2009 ground conditions. The updated Geographic Information System roads data set product, represented at 1:4,000 and +/- 10 meters spatial accuracy, contains 425,275 kilometers within eight attribute classes. The quality control of these products indicated a 97.7 percent accuracy of aspatial information and 98.0 percent accuracy of spatial locations. Approximately 48 percent of the updated roads data was corrected for spatial errors of greater than 1 meter relative to the pre-existing road data. Twenty-six percent of the updated roads involved correcting spatial errors of greater than 5 meters and 17 percent of the updated roads involved correcting spatial errors of greater than 9 meters. The Bureau of Land Management, other land managers, and researchers can use these new statewide roads data set products to support important studies and management decisions regarding land use changes, transportation and planning needs, transportation safety, wildlife applications, and other studies.
Wyoming↗
Mountain Lions of the Flagstaff Uplands: 2003-2006 Progress Report
Executive Summary Stakeholders in management of mountain lions in the Flagstaff Uplands of northern Arizona have expressed increasing concern about both potential impacts of humans on lions and potential risks posed by lions to humans. A series of human-mountain lion encounters during 2000-2001 on Mt. Elden, immediately adjacent to Flagstaff, and similar incidents during 2004 near Tucson brought increased attention to management of human safety in mountain lion range. These human-centered concerns, together with long-standing questions about how the human infrastructure centered on Flagstaff might be affecting lion movements led us to initiate a mountain lion study in 2003 which we plan to continue through 2009. Our study focuses on movements and other behaviors of mountain lions, with the goal of providing information that can be used to increase human safety, decrease human impacts, and, overall, provide insight into the ecology of lions in this region. To serve this goal, we have focused on collecting data that will be the basis of explanatory models that can provide spatially-explicit predictions of mountain lion activity, specify the effects of human facilities, such as highways and urban areas, and provide insight into when, where, and how often different kinds of lions kill different kinds of prey. During 2003-2006, we captured six female and five male mountain lions in the Flagstaff Uplands, 10 of which we fitted with collars that collected up to six high-precision GPS fixes per day, transmitted daily to our offices via Argos satellites. This timely delivery of data allowed us to visit kill sites and other foci of localized activity to collect detailed information on lion behavior. By June 2006 we had obtained 9357 GPS locations and visited 394 sites, at which we documented 218 kills, 165 of which were by five females and 53 by five males. These data were the basis for preliminary analyses presented in this report. All lions during all seasons exhibited a strong selection for rough terrain and forest or woodland cover. Females differed from males by selecting more strongly for intermediate, rather than extreme, levels of terrain roughness, by selecting more strongly for chaparral vegetation and related rocky areas during winter, and by not selecting as strongly for areas near water sources. Overall, lions collared during this study strongly avoided flat open areas in private ownership. Male but not female lions exhibited pronounced selection for National Park Service jurisdictions. Both males and females year-round avoided residential areas and a zone outward to about 1-3 km and, when within this zone, moved more slowly and with less change in direction compared to when farther away. Collared lions have so far rarely crossed paved highways of any description - orders of magnitude less often than expected by chance. We observed only 3 crossings of an interstate highway, all on I17 and none on I40. Elk comprised the majority (52%) of kills by lions in our study, followed by mule deer (46%), and small mammals (15%). Adults comprised most of the mule deer kills (68%) and mesocarnivores, primarily coyotes (n = 21), comprised 73% of smaller prey. Calf and short-yearling elk comprised the largest single category of kills (29%). In addition to kills, we documented seven instances of scavenging, involving four different lions. Females differed from males by killing more mule deer and virtually all of the mesocarnivores, and by killing fewer elk of all ages. Intervals between kills averaged between 144 hrs (young females) to 221 hours (adult females), whereas average time spent on a kill ranged from 19 hrs (adult males) to 40 hrs (young males). Carcass mass had a strong effect on likelihood that a lion would bury or relocate a kill, the percentage of edibles consumed, and overall time spent feeding. Time spent feeding and likelihoods of carcass burial and relocation all peaked at intermediate carcass masses, suggesting an optimal mass in the range of 50-150 kg, likely dictated as much by handling efficiencies and competition from other scavengers as by a lion's shear ability to kill prey. Adult male lions exhibited a life strategy distinctly different from all other sex-age classes that entailed moving more rapidly over larger areas, and spending less time on kills in which they invested less energy handling, but from which they consumed tissue at a higher sustained rate.
Open-File Report↗
A guide to safe field operations
Most functions of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Water Resources Division (WRD) require employees to participate in numerous field activities ranging from routine meetings with cooperators, other federal and public officials, and private citizens to potentially hazardous assignments, such as making flood measurements and scuba diving to service underwater instruments. It is paramount that each employee be aware of safety procedures and operational policies of the WRD to ensure that (1) their activities avoid or minimize personal injury to the employee, coworkers, or anyone in the vicinity of the field activity, and (2) their conduct does not infringe on the personal or property rights of any individual or organization. The purpose of the guide is to familiarize employees with the operational and safety procedures expected to be followed by each employee as a representative of the WRD. It is also intended as a training tool for all new employees and a document to be reviewed by each employee before undertaking a field assignment. It includes general procedures that are standard and applicable to all field operations, such as communication, vehicle operation, and adequate preparation for anticipated weather conditions. It also includes a discussion of specific procedures and safety considerations for most of the routine field assignments undertaken by hydrologists and hydrologic technicians of the WRD. The guide is not intended to be a technical handbook outlining step-by-step procedures for performing specific tasks or a comprehensive discussion of every possible activity that may be undertaken by a USGS employee. Employees are referred to the Techniques for Water-Resources Investigations (TWRI) series for specific technical procedures and to the U.S. Geological Survey Safety and Environmental Health Handbook 445-1-H (USGS, August 1989), USGS Occupational Hazards and Safety Procedures Handbook 445-2-H (December 1993), the WRD notebook on Safety Policy and Guidance Memoranda, and other references for procedures and safety issues related to nonroutine activities, such as operations on large vessels and aircraft.
Open-File Report↗
Types of damage that could result from a great earthquake in the New Madrid, Missouri, seismic zone
In the winter of 1811–1812 a series of three great earthquakes occurred in the New Madrid seismic zone. In addition to the three principal shocks, at least 15 other earthquakes, I o ≥ VIII, occurred within a year of the first large earthquake on December 16, 1811. The three main shocks were felt over the entire eastern United States. They were strong enough to cause minor damage as far away as Indiana and Ohio on the north, the Carolinas on the east, and southern Mississippi on the south. They were strong enough to cause severe or structural damage in parts of Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. The section of this poster titled "Seismic history of the New Madrid region" describes what happened in the epicentral region. Fortunately, few people lived in the severely shaken area in 1811; that is not the case today. What would happen if a series of earthquakes as large and numerous as the "New Madrid" earthquakes were to occur in the New Madrid seismic zone today? Photographs 1-10 show typical damage to structures that occurred during various earthquakes in the United States. Structural damage to buildings in the Modified Mercalli intensity scale, a scale used for assigning numbers to earthquake effects, begins at intensity VIII. Minor or architectural damage (cracked plaster, windows, and chimneys) occurs at intensities VI and VII, and effects on people and small objects predominate at intensities below VI (earthquake felt, direction and duration noted, dishes broken). Photographs 1-10 illustrate damage caused by intensity VIII and above. None of the damage shown in these photographs occurred in earthquakes larger than the 1811–1812 New Madrid shocks, and most of the examples are from considerably smaller shocks. Photographs 1-4 and 7 show damage to masonry buildings, mostly old and unreinforced, none designed to be earthquake resistant. How many such buildings are in use in your community? Photographs 5 and 6 show damage to modern structures close to the epicenter of a magnitude 6.5 earthquake, a small shock compared to the magnitudes (8.4–8.7) of the New Madrid earthquakes. Photographs 8–10 are typical of damage that can occur at large distances from great earthquakes. Tall buildings are particularly susceptible to ground motions with relatively long periods (greater than 1 second), while short, rigid buildings are generally more likely to be damaged by ground motions with periods of less than 1 second. Shorter period ground motions attenuate more rapidly with distance from the epicenter than do the longer period motions. The 1811-1812 earthquakes produced extensive ground effects. Earthquakes can cause many different kinds of ground effects, ranging from minor fissures, slumps, and rockslides to major landslides and disturbances of the ground surface. Photographs 1117 show typical earthquake ground effects and the kinds of damage they can cause to manmade structures. Is another earthquake as large as the 1811-1812 shocks really likely to occur in New Madrid seismic zone? Great earthquakes such as the 1811-1812 series are estimated to occur in the zone on the average every 500 years. However, earthquakes strong enough to cause structural damage (VIII in the Modified Mercalli intensity scale) are estimated to occur in the seismic zone on the average every 50 years. The last such shock occurred in 1843. How do you prepare for a possible earthquake and what do you do if one occurs? The section on "Earthquake safety tips" explains what to do before, during, and after an earthquake. Want to know more? See "Sources of additional information." Other reports of interest are listed in "References cited."
New Madrid seismic zone↗
Groundwater flow systems at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada: A synthesis of potentiometric contours, hydrostratigraphy, and geologic structures
Contaminants introduced into the subsurface of the Nevada Test Site by underground nuclear testing are of concern to the U.S. Department of Energy and regulators responsible for protecting human health and safety. The potential for contaminant movement away from the underground test areas and into the accessible environment is greatest by groundwater transport. The primary hydrologic control on this transport is evaluated and examined through a series of contour maps developed to represent the hydraulic-head distribution within each of the major aquifers underlying the area. Aquifers were identified and their extents delineated by merging and analyzing multiple hydrostratigraphic framework models developed by other investigators from existing geologic information. A map of the hydraulic-head distribution in each major aquifer was developed from a detailed evaluation and assessment of available water-level measurements. Multiple spreadsheets that accompany this report provide pertinent water-level and geologic data by well or drill hole. Aquifers are mapped and discussed in general terms as being one of two types: alluvial–volcanic, or carbonate. Both aquifer types are subdivided and mapped as independent regional and local aquifers, based on the continuity of their component rock. Groundwater-flow directions, approximated from potentiometric contours that were developed from the hydraulic-head distribution, are indicated on the maps and discussed for each of the regional aquifers and for selected local aquifers. Hydraulic heads vary across the study area and are interpreted to range in altitude from greater than 5,000 feet in a regional alluvial–volcanic aquifer beneath a recharge area in the northern part of the study area to less than 2,300 feet in regional alluvial–volcanic and carbonate aquifers in the southwestern part of the study area. Flow directions throughout the study area are dominantly south-southwest with some local deviations. Vertical hydraulic gradients between aquifer types are downward throughout most of the study area; however, flow from the alluvial–volcanic aquifer into the underlying carbonate aquifer, where both aquifers are present, is believed to be minor because of an intervening confining unit. Limited exchange of water between aquifer types occurs by diffuse flow through the confining unit, by focused flow along fault planes, or by direct flow where the confining unit is locally absent. Interflow between regional aquifers is evaluated and mapped to define major flow paths. These flow paths delineate tributary flow systems, which converge to form intermediate and regional flow systems. The implications of these flow systems in controlling transport of radionuclides away from the underground test areas at the Nevada Test Site are briefly discussed. Additionally, uncertainties in the delineation of aquifers, the development of potentiometric contours, and the identification of flow systems are identified and evaluated. Eleven tributary flow systems and three larger flow systems are mapped in the Nevada Test Site area. Flow systems within the alluvial–volcanic aquifer dominate the western half of the study area, whereas flow systems within the carbonate aquifer are most prevalent in the southeastern half of the study area. Most of the flow in the regional alluvial–volcanic aquifer that moves through the underground testing area on Pahute Mesa is discharged to the land surface at springs and seeps in Oasis Valley. Flow in the regional carbonate aquifer is internally compartmentalized by major geologic structures, primarily thrust faults, which constrain flow into separate corridors. Contaminants that reach the regional carbonate aquifer from testing areas in Yucca and Frenchman Flats flow toward downgradient discharge areas through the Alkali Flat–Furnace Creek Ranch or Ash Meadows flow systems and their tributaries.
Nevada↗
Delineation of flooding within the Ozark National Scenic Riverways in southeastern Missouri - Round Spring and Powder Mill
This is the second report in a series of U.S. Geological Survey Hydrologic Investigations Atlases to further supplement the National Park Service general management and development concept plan for the Ozark National Scenic Riverways (National Park Service, 1981) in southeastern Missouri (fig. 1). The technical basis on which the National Park Service can develop flood-management plans for use in evaluating their existing or future developments at Akers and Alley Spring recreational areas is given in Hydrologic Investigations Atlas HA-712-A (Alexander, in press). The Ozark National Scenic Riverways, administered by the National Park Service, is an extensively used recreational area where approximately 2 million visitors per year (M.E. Hunter, National Park Service, oral commun., 1985) participate in a wide range of river-use and land-based activities. Visitor areas along the 134-mi (mile) reach of the Current River and its principal tributary, Jacks Fork, range from highly-developed areas mostly along the upper Current River to primitive camping areas and river accesses along the Jacks Fork and downstream reach of the Current River. Most facilities at these developments are in or near flood-prone areas. Therefore, because of visitor safety, a major consideration of the National Park Service is the implementation of a flood-warning system.
Missouri↗
Predevelopment Water-Level Contours for Aquifers in the Rainier Mesa and Shoshone Mountain area of the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada
Contaminants introduced into the subsurface of the Nevada Test Site at Rainier Mesa and Shoshone Mountain by underground nuclear testing are of concern to the U.S. Department of Energy and regulators responsible for protecting human health and safety. Although contaminants were introduced into low-permeability rocks above the regional flow system, the potential for contaminant movement away from the underground test areas and into the accessible environment is greatest by ground-water transport. The primary hydrologic control on this transport is evaluated and examined through a series of contour maps developed to represent the water-level distribution within each of the major aquifers underlying the area. Aquifers were identified and their extents delineated by merging and analyzing multiple hydrostratigraphic framework models developed by other investigators from existing geologic information. The contoured water-level distribution in each major aquifer was developed from a detailed evaluation and assessment of available water-level measurements. Multiple spreadsheets that accompany this report provide pertinent water-level and geologic data by well or drill hole. Aquifers are mapped, presented, and discussed in general terms as being one of three aquifer types?volcanic aquifer, upper carbonate aquifer, or lower carbonate aquifer. Each of these aquifer types was subdivided and mapped as independent continuous and isolated aquifers, based on the continuity of its component rock. Ground-water flow directions, as related to the transport of test-generated contaminants, were developed from water-level contours and are presented and discussed for each of the continuous aquifers. Contoured water-level altitudes vary across the study area and range from more than 5,000 feet in the volcanic aquifer beneath a recharge area in the northern part of the study area to less than 2,450 feet in the lower carbonate aquifer in the southern part of the study area. Variations in water-level altitudes within any single continuous aquifer range from a few hundred feet in a lower carbonate aquifer to just more than 1,100 feet in a volcanic aquifer. Flow directions throughout the study area are dominantly southward with minor eastward or westward deviations. Primary exceptions are westward flow in the northern part of the volcanic aquifer and eastward flow in the eastern part of the lower carbonate aquifer. Northward flow in the upper and lower carbonate aquifers in the northern part of the study area is possible but cannot be substantiated because data are lacking. Interflow between continuous aquifers is evaluated and mapped to define major flow paths. These flow paths delineate tributary flow systems, which converge to form the regional ground-water flow system. The implications of these tributary flow paths in controlling transport away from the underground test areas at Rainier Mesa and Shoshone Mountain are discussed. The obvious data gaps contributing to uncertainties in the delineation of aquifers and development of water-level contours are identified and evaluated.
Scientific Investigations Report↗
Determination of infiltration and percolation rates along a reach of the Santa Fe River near La Bajada, New Mexico
Two methods, one a surface-water method and the second a ground-water method, were used to determine infiltration and percolation rates along a 2.5-kilometer reach of the Santa Fe River near La Bajada, New Mexico. The surface-water method uses streamflow measurements and their differences along a stream reach, streamflow-loss rates, stream surface area, and evaporation rates to determine infiltration rates. The ground-water method uses heat as a tracer to monitor percolation through shallow streambed sediments. Data collection began in October 1996 and continued through December 1997. During that period the stream reach was instrumented with three streamflow gages, and temperature profiles were monitored from the stream-sediment interface to about 3 meters below the streambed at four sites along the reach. Infiltration is the downward flow of water through the stream- sediment interface. Infiltration rates ranged from 92 to 267 millimeters per day for an intense measurement period during June 26- 28, 1997, and from 69 to 256 millimeters per day during September 27-October 6, 1997. Investigators calculated infiltration rates from streamflow loss, stream surface-area measurements, and evaporation-rate estimates. Infiltration rates may be affected by unmeasured irrigation-return flow in the study reach. Although the amount of irrigation-return flow was none to very small, it may result in underestimation of infiltration rates. The infiltration portion of streamflow loss was much greater than the evaporation portion. Infiltration accounted for about 92 to 98 percent of streamflow loss. Evaporation-rate estimates ranged from 3.4 to 7.6 millimeters per day based on pan-evaporation data collected at Cochiti Dam, New Mexico, and accounted for about 2 to 8 percent of streamflow loss. Percolation is the movement of water through saturated or unsaturated sediments below the stream-sediment interface. Percolation rates ranged from 40 to 109 millimeters per day during June 26-28, 1997. Percolation rates were not calculated for the September 27-October 6, 1997, period because a late summer flood removed the temperature sensors from the streambed. Investigators used a heat-and-water flow model, VS2DH (variably saturated, two- dimensional heat), to calculate near-surface streambed infiltration and percolation rates from temperatures measured in the stream and streambed. Near the stream-sediment interface, infiltration and percolation rates are comparable. Comparison of infiltration and percolation rates showed that infiltration rates were greater than percolation rates. The method used to calculate infiltration rates accounted for net loss or gain over the entire stream reach, whereas the method used to calculate percolation was dependent on point measurements and, as applied in this study, neglected the nonvertical component of heat and water fluxes. In general, using the ground-water method was less labor intensive than making a series of streamflow measurements and relied on temperature, an easily measured property. The ground-water method also eliminated the difficulty of measuring or estimating evaporation from the water surface and was therefore more direct. Both methods are difficult to use during periods of flood flow. The ground-water method has problems with the thermocouple-wire temperature sensors washing out during flood events. The surface- water method often cannot be used because of safety concerns for personnel making wading streamflow measurements.
New Mexico↗
Simulated hydrologic response to climate change during the 21st century in New Hampshire
The U.S. Geological Survey, in cooperation with the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and the Department of Health and Human Services, has developed a hydrologic model to assess the effects of short- and long-term climate change on hydrology in New Hampshire. This report documents the model and datasets developed by using the model to predict how climate change will affect the hydrologic cycle and provide data that can be used by State and local agencies to identify locations that are vulnerable to the effects of climate change in areas across New Hampshire. Future hydrologic projections were developed from the output of five general circulation models for two future climate scenarios. The scenarios are based on projected future greenhouse gas emissions and estimates of land-use and land-cover change within a projected global economic framework. An evaluation of the possible effect of projected future temperature on modeling of evapotranspiration is summarized to address concerns regarding the implications of the future climate on model parameters that are based on climate variables. The results of the model simulations are hydrologic projections indicating increasing streamflow across the State with large increases in streamflow during winter and early spring and general decreases during late spring and summer. Wide spatial variability in changes to groundwater recharge is projected, with general decreases in the Connecticut River Valley and at high elevations in the northern part of the State and general increases in coastal and lowland areas of the State. In general, total winter snowfall is projected to decrease across the State, but there is a possibility of increasing snow in some locations, particularly during November, February, and March. The simulated future changes in recharge and snowfall vary by watershed across the State. This means that each area of the State could experience very different changes, depending on topography or other factors. Therefore, planning for infrastructure and public safety needs to be flexible in order to address the range of possible outcomes indicated by the various model simulations. The absolute magnitude and timing of the daily streamflows, especially the larger floods, are not considered to be reliably simulated compared to changes in frequency and duration of daily streamflows and changes in accumulated monthly and seasonal streamflow volumes. Simulated current and future streamflow, groundwater recharge, and snowfall datasets include simulated data derived from the five general circulation models used in this study for a current reference time period and two future time periods. Average monthly streamflow time series datasets are provided for 27 streamgages in New Hampshire. Fourteen of the 27 streamgages associated with daily streamflow time series showed a good calibration. Average monthly groundwater recharge and snowfall time series for the same reference time period and two future time periods are also provided for each of the 467 hydrologic response units that compose the model.
New Hampshire↗
A draft decision framework for the National Park Service Interior Region 5 bison stewardship strategy
The Department of the Interior Bison Conservation Initiative calls for its bureaus to plan and implement collaborative American bison conservation and to ensure involvement by tribal, state, and local governments and the public in that conservation. Four independently managed and geographically separated National Park Service (NPS) units in Interior Region 5 (IR5) preserve bison and other components of a formerly contiguous Great Plains landscape. Management of bison in IR5 parks has historically been specific to each park, and livestock and range management science informed much of the decision making. In the past two decades, NPS has shifted away from managing bison from this livestock-based perspective towards a wildlife stewardship approach, including ensuring their long-term adaptive potential and considering them as just one part of a complex ecosystem. This shift requires a more holistic and cooperative approach to stewardship that is challenging not only because of limitations in funding and fluctuations in leadership priorities, but also because of the constraints imposed by the parks’ relatively small, fenced areas. The IR5 NPS Bison Stewardship Strategy (“Strategy”) will help the NPS to meet its responsibilities in cooperative stewardship of bison. The Strategy will serve to organize and consolidate the NPS’s legal and policy responsibilities within a framework of collectively defined values and objectives to support the careful and transparent decision-making processes that both guide and transcend park-specific planning. This report describes a preliminary decision framework for the Strategy, including the context, the fundamental objectives, and a range of alternative strategies developed and considered through two workshops and a series of conference calls with NPS personnel, stakeholders, and outside experts with an interest in IR5 NPS bison stewardship. Although not the Strategy itself, this framework serves as the Strategy’s starting point and identifies 14 fundamental objectives, falling in four major themes: Persistence of Wild and Healthy Bison 1. Maximize the long-term persistence of bison in IR5 parks 2. Maximize the long-term adaptive capacity of bison in North America 3. Maximize the wildness of the bison herds 4. Maximize humane treatment of bison, while allowing natural processes to occur Supporting Tribal Buffalo Culture 5. Improve relationships, trust, and communication with Tribes to enhance shared stewardship of bison within and beyond IR5 6. Maximize the number of live, healthy bison that can be transferred to tribal herds Persistence of Native Ecological Communities and Processes 7. Maximize structural and compositional heterogeneity of native prairie plant communities across space and time within each park 8. Maximize the abundance and diversity of animal species of special concern 9. Minimize the loss of native grassland within each park 10. Minimize the abundance of exotic plants in the park landscape 11. Maximize riparian area and wetland integrity Public Outreach 12. Maximize the number of healthy, wild bison that are visible to the public 13. Maximize the safety of visitors 14. Maximize public understanding of the past, present, and future of bison and Native Americans in the Great Plains The terms “minimize” and “maximize” in these objectives describe the desired direction for each individual objective. Finding the right balance among these objectives and any others identified in further work is one of the central challenges in developing the Strategy. To that end, this report also demonstrates and describes potential methods for evaluating how well alternative strategies would achieve each of the fundamental objectives.
Natural Resource Report↗
Preparations for water sampling
The “National Field Manual for the Collection of Water-Quality Data” (NFM) provides guidelines and procedures for U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) personnel who collect data used to assess the quality of the Nation’s surface-water and groundwater resources. This chapter, NFM A1, provides an overview of preparations for water sampling, which includes site reconnaissance, project work plans, quality-assurance plans, basic equipment and supplies needed for fieldwork, safety precautions, and planning for data management. It updates and supersedes USGS Techniques of Water-Resources Investigations, book 9, chapter A1, version 2.0, by F.D. Wilde. Before 2017, the NFM chapters were released in the USGS Techniques of Water-Resources Investigations series. Effective in 2018, new and revised NFM chapters are being released in the USGS Techniques and Methods series; this series change does not affect the content and format of the NFM. More information is in the general introduction to the NFM (USGS Techniques and Methods, book 9, chapter A0) at https://doi.org/10.3133/tm9A0 . The authoritative current versions of NFM chapters are available in the USGS Publications Warehouse at https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/ . Comments, questions, and suggestions related to the NFM can be addressed to nfm-owq@usgs.gov .
Techniques and Methods↗
TRIGRS - A Fortran Program for Transient Rainfall Infiltration and Grid-Based Regional Slope-Stability Analysis, Version 2.0
The Transient Rainfall Infiltration and Grid-Based Regional Slope-Stability Model (TRIGRS) is a Fortran program designed for modeling the timing and distribution of shallow, rainfall-induced landslides. The program computes transient pore-pressure changes, and attendant changes in the factor of safety, due to rainfall infiltration. The program models rainfall infiltration, resulting from storms that have durations ranging from hours to a few days, using analytical solutions for partial differential equations that represent one-dimensional, vertical flow in isotropic, homogeneous materials for either saturated or unsaturated conditions. Use of step-function series allows the program to represent variable rainfall input, and a simple runoff routing model allows the user to divert excess water from impervious areas onto more permeable downslope areas. The TRIGRS program uses a simple infinite-slope model to compute factor of safety on a cell-by-cell basis. An approximate formula for effective stress in unsaturated materials aids computation of the factor of safety in unsaturated soils. Horizontal heterogeneity is accounted for by allowing material properties, rainfall, and other input values to vary from cell to cell. This command-line program is used in conjunction with geographic information system (GIS) software to prepare input grids and visualize model results.
Open-File Report↗
Database for potential hazards from future volcanic eruptions in California
More than 500 volcanic vents have been identified in the State of California. At least 76 of these vents have erupted, some repeatedly, during the past 10,000 yr. Past volcanic activity has ranged in scale and type from small rhyolitic and basaltic eruptions through large catastrophic rhyolitic eruptions. Sooner or later, volcanoes in California will erupt again, and they could have serious impacts on the health and safety of the State's citizens as well as on its economy. This report describes the nature and probable distribution of potentially hazardous volcanic phenomena and their threat to people and property. It includes hazard-zonation maps that show areas relatively likely to be affected by future eruptions in California. This digital release contains information from maps of potential hazards from future volcanic eruptions in the state of California, published as Plate 1 in U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1847. The main component of this digital release is a spatial database prepared using geographic information systems (GIS) applications. This release also contains links to files to view or print the map plate, main report text, and accompanying hazard tables from Bulletin 1847. It should be noted that much has been learned about the ages of eruptive events in the State of California since the publication of Bulletin 1847 in 1989. For the most up to date information on the status of California volcanoes, please refer to the U.S. Geological Survey Volcano Hazards Program website.
California↗
The fate of cyanide in leach wastes at gold mines: an environmental perspective
This paper reviews the basic chemistry of cyanide, methods by which cyanide can be analyzed, and aspects of cyanide behavior that are most relevant to environmental considerations at mineral processing operations associated with gold mines. The emphasis is on research results reported since 1999 and on data gathered for a series of U.S. Geological Survey studies that began in the late 1990s. Cyanide is added to process solutions as the CN − anion, but ore leaching produces numerous other cyanide-containing and cyanide-related species in addition to the desired cyanocomplex of gold. These can include hydrogen cyanide (HCN); cyanometallic complexes of iron, copper, zinc, nickel, and many other metals; cyanate (CNO − ); and thiocyanate (SCN − ). The fate of these species in solid wastes and residual process solutions that remain once gold recovery activities are terminated and in any water that moves beyond the ore processing facility dictates the degree to which cyanide poses a risk to aquatic organisms and aquatic-dependent organisms in the local environment. Cyanide-containing and cyanide-related species are subject to attenuation mechanisms that lead to dispersal to the atmosphere, chemical transformation to other carbon and nitrogen species, or sequestration as cyanometallic precipitates or adsorbed species on mineral surfaces. Dispersal to the atmosphere and chemical transformation amount to permanent elimination of cyanide, whereas sequestration amounts to storage of cyanide in locations from which it can potentially be remobilized by infiltrating waters if conditions change. From an environmental perspective, the most significant cyanide releases from gold leach operations involve catastrophic spills of process solutions or leakage of effluent to the unsaturated or saturated zones. These release pathways are unfavorable for two important cyanide attenuation mechanisms that tend to occur naturally: dispersal of free cyanide to the atmosphere and sunlight-catalyzed dissociation of strong cyanometallic complexes, which produces free cyanide that can then disperse to the atmosphere. The widest margins of environmental safety will be achieved where mineral processing operations are designed so that time for offgassing, aeration, and sunlight exposure are maximized in the event that cyanide-bearing solutions are released inadvertently.
Applied Geochemistry↗
Phase 1 technical implementation plan for the expansion of the ShakeAlert earthquake early warning system to Alaska
Executive Summary The conference report accompanying the fiscal year (FY) 2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 117–103) for the U.S. Department of the Interior and related agencies directed the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to “work with the State of Alaska to develop an implementation plan to be completed within two years in order to put ShakeAlert/Earthquake Early Warning in Alaska” (p. 29). Congress included $1 million in the FY 2022 appropriation to conduct this effort. The USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, along with partner organizations, has developed the ShakeAlert earthquake early warning (EEW) system for the West Coast, which currently operates in California, Oregon, and Washington. The purpose of the system and its alert delivery partners is to reduce the impact of earthquakes and save lives and property by delivering ShakeAlert-powered alerts that are transmitted to the public via mass notification technologies, and by providing more detailed data streams to institutional users and commercial service providers to trigger automated, user-specific, protective actions. ShakeAlert was designed in such a way that it could be expanded to other U.S. regions with high earthquake risk, after the build-out of seismic and geodetic networks to support ShakeAlert in a specified region is completed and the necessary funding is secured for long-term operation and maintenance. When an earthquake occurs, seismic waves radiate from the rupturing fault like waves on a pond. It is these waves that people feel as earthquake shaking and that can cause damage to structures. Using networks of ground-motion sensors and sophisticated computer algorithms, ShakeAlert can detect an earthquake seconds after it begins, calculate its location and magnitude, and estimate the resulting intensity of shaking. Early warnings of impending shaking are then sent to people and systems that may experience damaging shaking, allowing them to take appropriate protective actions. Depending on the user’s distance from the earthquake, alerts may be delivered before, during, or after the arrival of strong shaking. There will almost always be a region near the earthquake epicenter where alerts arrive after damaging shaking has begun. The ShakeAlert system updates its ground-motion estimates as an earthquake grows larger. In response to the FY 2022 congressional direction, the USGS worked with the State of Alaska to devise this implementation plan for ShakeAlert expansion to Alaska. The USGS engaged with the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS&EM) and the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys (DGGS). A cooperative agreement was awarded to the Alaska Earthquake Center (AEC) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) for their contributions to the plan and their work coordinating with other networks in Alaska. The USGS engaged with the Alaska Seismic Hazards Safety Commission (ASHSC) throughout the process. The USGS also held a series of Alaska stakeholder engagements. The process of developing the implementation plan was facilitated by contracted staff from Corner Alliance, which is a government consulting firm. This implementation plan describes the details and estimates the costs for a Phase 1 expansion of the ShakeAlert system to Alaska. A geographically limited Phase 1 goal was chosen that covers the highest risk and most populated areas of Alaska. The areas proposed encompass the State’s main population centers and 90 percent of the State’s population. This Phase 1 design is considered very challenging and ambitious from the viewpoint of network operators. The lessons learned if this plan is implemented could be used to consider subsequent phases to expand EEW beyond Phase 1 in Alaska in the future. ShakeAlert is built on the foundation of the sensor networks and data processing infrastructure of the USGS-led Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). This implementation plan calls for a total of 450 high-quality, real-time EEW-capable ANSS seismic stations in Alaska: 270 new stations, 160 upgraded stations, and 20 existing stations. These seismic station numbers are based on a station spacing of 10 kilometers (km) in urban areas, 20 km in seismic source areas that endanger population centers, and 40 km in other areas. The associated costs also include support for some EEW-capable global navigation satellite system (GNSS) stations, with a focus on improving warnings for large subduction zone earthquakes. For effective EEW, ShakeAlert requires low-latency, high-availability, robust telemetry links to deliver continuous, real-time data from field stations to the data centers. The Alaska data processing hardware infrastructure would follow the general design for fail-safe operation that is used for the ShakeAlert system on the West Coast. The ShakeAlert architecture uses two independent layers: the production layer for earthquake processing and the alert layer to make alerting decisions and serve alerts to users. This implementation plan includes two geographically separated data centers in Alaska, each with two fully independent production and alert layers using the same system design developed for the West Coast. As of March 2024, the ShakeAlert system is at version 3.0.1, with more advanced versions in the development and testing pipeline. ShakeAlert originally used two algorithms to determine the location and magnitude of earthquakes using seismic data. A third algorithm that can calculate very large magnitudes of very large earthquakes with geodetic data was added in March 2024. ShakeAlert publishes several data and alert products to meet the needs of different users. All messages include the location of the earthquake, either as a point or a line, and its magnitude. Ground-shaking estimates are published in two forms, as ground-motion contours and a map grid. Providing adequate warning time for strong shaking (the “target threshold”) requires sending alerts at a threshold lower than that strong shaking level (the “alert threshold”). The thresholds for public alerting in Alaska would be a joint USGS and State decision. To have the greatest benefit, ShakeAlert-powered alerts would be delivered to institutional users and individuals by all practical pathways. The USGS alert layer can support thousands of institutional users and alert redistributors, but the USGS does not have the mission nor the infrastructure and expertise to perform mass notifications to the public or implement automatic actions for end users of the alerts. To meet this need, ShakeAlert recruits private sector “technology enablers” that have the necessary expertise to develop end-user implementations using EEW alerts with the goal of stimulating an EEW industry. Earthquake early warning alerts are useless if people do not know how to respond to them. Although the alert messages include instructions about what to do (drop, cover, and hold on), alerts are more effective if people have been trained in advance. Messages about ShakeAlert’s capabilities, limitations, and benefits could be integrated with existing earthquake education programs, including State-run programs. Therefore, ShakeAlert would coordinate with both public and private partners and stakeholders through various partnerships and agreements to accomplish consistent and ongoing public earthquake hazard education. The estimated capital cost of completing the computing infrastructure and sensor networks for the Phase 1 ShakeAlert expansion to Alaska is approximately $66 million in 2024 dollars. The annual operation and maintenance cost of the completed system is estimated to be $12 million per year in 2024 dollars when fully built out.
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Field-based description of rhyolite lava flows of the Calico Hills Formation, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada
Contaminants introduced into the subsurface of Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, by underground nuclear testing are of concern to the U.S. Department of Energy and regulators responsible for protecting human health and safety. The potential for contaminant movement away from the underground test areas at Pahute Mesa and into the accessible environment is greatest by groundwater transport through fractured volcanic rocks. The 12.9 Ma (mega-annums, million years) Calico Hills Formation, which consists of a mixture of rhyolite lava flows and intercalated nonwelded and bedded tuff and pyroclastic flow deposits, occurs in two areas of the Nevada National Security Site. One area is north of the Rainier Mesa caldera, buried beneath Pahute Mesa, and serves as a heterogeneous volcanic-rock aquifer but is only available to study through drilling and is not described in this report. A second accumulation of the formation is south of the Rainier Mesa caldera and is exposed in outcrop along the western boundary of the Nevada National Security Site at the Calico Hills near Yucca Mountain. These outcrops expose in three dimensions an interlayered sequence of tuff and lava flows similar to those intercepted in the subsurface beneath Pahute Mesa. Field description and geologic mapping of these exposures described lithostratigraphic variations within lava flows and assisted in, or at least corroborated, conceptualization of the rhyolite lava-bearing parts of the formation. In the area south of the Rainier Mesa caldera, surface exposures and nearby subsurface equivalents were studied through compilation of geologic maps, new field mapping, subsurface information from boreholes, and data extracted from three-dimensional geologic framework models. Rhyolite lava flows within the Calico Hills Formation are described in terms of lithostratigraphic variations established for rhyolite lava flows in other volcanic fields. In general, the flows consist of a core of crystallized, flow-banded rhyolite lava, surrounded by a carapace of obsidian, commonly mantled by blocky, pumiceous rhyolite lava and flow breccia. Rhyolite lava flows were correlated and mapped on the basis of distinctive appearance in outcrop, stratigraphic sequence, and the presence of stratigraphic markers. Pyroclastic deposits that are spatially, temporally, and genetically related to the rhyolite lava flows consist of a series of intercalated pyroclastic flows, bedded ash-fall, and reworked tuff that have varying amounts of pumice and volcanic rock clasts. In the area south of the Rainier Mesa caldera, surface and subsurface geologic data are combined to interpret the overall thickness of the Calico Hills Formation and the proportion of lava flow lithology across the study area. The formation is at least 500 meters (m) thick and contains the greatest proportion of rhyolite lava flow to the northeast of Yucca Mountain in the lower part of Fortymile Canyon. The formation thins to the south and southwest where it is between 50 and 200 m thick beneath Yucca Mountain and contains no rhyolite lavas. Geologic mapping and field-based correlation of individual lava flows allow for the interpretation of the thickness and extent of specific flows and the location of their source areas. The most extensive flows have widths from 2 to 3 kilometers (km) and lengths of at least 5–6 km. Lava flow thickness varies from 150 to 250 m above interpreted source vents to between 30 and 80 m in more distal locations. Rhyolite lavas have length-to-height ratios of 10:1 or greater and, in one instance, a length-to-width ratio of 2:1 or greater, implying a tongue-shaped geometry instead of circular domes or tabular bodies. Although geologic mapping did not identify any physical feature that could be positively identified as a vent, lava flow thickness and the size of clasts in subjacent pyroclastic deposits suggest that primary vent areas for at least some of the flows in the study area are on the east side of Fortymile Canyon, to the northeast of Yucca Mountain.
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