Norms for bid distributions in sealed tender markets: An approach through simmulation
A substantial number of economic transactions occur through competition in which agents participate by submitting sealed bids.
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Publications and source records attributed to S.R. Johnson.
A substantial number of economic transactions occur through competition in which agents participate by submitting sealed bids.
Much of the available analysis of policies for the disposal of publicly held resources is based on comparatively straightforward extensions of the neoclassical pricing and allocation theory. As such, these analyses have to a large extent not fully incorporated the fact that firms normally acquire rights to these resources in sealed tender markets. In this paper, a simple bidding model is used to show that the choice of disposal policies can influence the firm's bid and also the public revenues obtained from the sale of the resource. It is additionally shown that the implications of such policy choices are conditioned by the firm's attitudes towards risk. Finally, it is argued that a modification of existing prescriptions may be necessary if a more realistic specification of the disposal problem taking account of the sealed tender market in which rights are obtained, is considered.
Public agencies are frequently constrained to procure goods and services in sealed tender markets. Pricing decisions of firms participating in such markets have been analyzed for both static and dynamic situations. As might be anticipated, the decision rules obtained in these analyses depend in an integral way on the firm's perception of the behavior of other market participants. It is this aspect of the pricing problem to which our paper is directed.
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No abstract available.